Handbook on Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation in Xinjiang

I have previously written of resistance from patriotic students in Beijing to the agreements signed between the Soviet Union and China in March 1950 which called for the creation of several joint-stock companies in Xinjiang. There were three agreements concerning Xinjiang: one establishing a joint civilian airline company, another for a petroleum enterprise, and the last for the mining of nonferrous metals. Although the terms of the agreements were publicly portrayed as being based on the principle of equality, the exact texts of the agreements remained secret. Galvanized students protested Sino-Soviet economic cooperation, believing the three agreements were early harbingers of China’s renewed exploitation by foreign powers. (Readers, this summary might also sound familiar if you’ve read or consulted Dieter Heinzig’s voluminous Die Sowjetunion und das Kommunistische China, 1945-1950– I mean, The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance. Page 376, to be exact).

Courtesy of the Center for Research Libraries

Well, yesterday evening I rather carelessly stumbled upon a bit of a goldmine, the Zhongsu jingji hezuo xuexi shouce, a study guide or primer on the agreements, published in April 1950. You might simply call this piece of work “In Defense of Sino-Soviet Cooperation: A Guide for Students.” If students in China were really concerned that China’s sovereignty and control over Xinjiang was in jeopardy as a result of dealings with the Soviet Union, then this guide was designed to assuage student complaints. Page after page, quote after quote, the booklet assaults any argument against Sino-Soviet cooperation and, indeed, attempts to instill a sense of guilt among those who ever doubted the goodness of Sino-Soviet commercial agreements.

The contents of the book appear to focus on three different forms of Sino-Soviet economic cooperation, including Soviet loans to China and the Sino-Soviet civilian airline, but it in fact primarily focuses on the agreements for the Sino-Soviet petroleum and nonferrous metals companies in Xinjiang. It’s table of contents is, roughly, as follows:

1. Text of Agreements and News Bulletins [Xieding zhengwen ji gongbao]
2. Chinese Public Opinion [Guonei yulun]
3. Expressions from All Walks of Life [Gejie biaoshi]
4. Research on the New Sino-Soviet Agreements [Zhongsu xin xieding yanjiu]
5. Materials for Study and Reference [Xuexi ji cankao ziliao]

Sections 1 and 2 are largely reprints from newspapers such as Xinhua, Renmin Ribao, and Xinjiang Ribao. Part 3 is more interesting and contains statements from a variety of individuals. Of note, there are considerably more defenses published for the joint stock companies in Xinjiang (more than 20) than the Soviet loan (5). Moreover, we also hear from big names such as Tao Zhiyue and Zhang Zhizhong.

Given his long experience in the northwest, Zhang Zhizhong was probably viewed as one of China proper’s most foremost experts on Xinjiang, and his approval of Sino-Soviet cooperation probably carried more weight than any other onlooker. In his writing, Zhang consistently expressed that these types of agreements were precisely what the people of Xinjiang had wanted for decades. What’s more, Zhang explained, China simply had no way to develop the “new frontier” on her own, with shortages in machinery and technical expertise, and severe transportation difficulties.

Commander Tao Zhiyue supports Sino-Soviet cooperation, and so should you!

His counterpart, Tao Zhiyue added that the GMD and Sheng Shicai had ruined previous Sino-Soviet cooperation in Xinjiang, and in doing so did a great deal of detriment to the people of Xinjiang. Tao, the esteemed general who cut off contact with the Guomindang and announced his allegiance to the PLA in September 1949, admired the Soviets technical expertise and what China stood to learn from the Soviet Union. His argument boiled down, working with the Soviet Union will speed up the process of developing Xinjiang, mining it’s precious resources, and industrializing the nation– how is this not in China’s favor?

Other interviewees included Beijing-based professors, Chinese experts on oil and gas, and at least one local from the Ili region named Ma-er-guo-fu [马尔果夫], formerly of the Eastern Turkestan Republic’s National Army ["民族军"]. Ma-er-guo-fu (whose original name is unclear) was so excited that he “立刻要翻译人员拿着报纸详细地给他讲解公报的全文,” in other words, because his Chinese was poor, he summoned a translator to read him the Chinese newspaper reports in full. He believed Sino-Soviet cooperation in oil production would help alleviate some of the transportation difficulties that had handicapped Xinjiang’s economic development for years– maybe now the trader from Kashgar would finally see the Altaic vistas in northern Xinjiang? Xinjiang’s daunting terrain had been a burden to the cohesiveness of the province since the beginning of time, and hence also to China’s rule over the restive region, and Ma-er-guo-fu was advocating Sino-Soviet economic cooperation in order to finally overcome this hurdle. (I recommend reading Rudelson’s wonderful and concise Oasis Identities for a discussion on this  issue).

Section 4 includes several essays on the benefits of Sino-Soviet cooperation in Xinjiang, including one piece written by a research team from prominent newspaper Ta Kung Pao [大公报]. Section 5 includes a nice map, which I’ve posted below. Ideally I’ll review Sections 4 and 5 with a little more depth over the next several days and update this post.

Readers, look at all the goods surrounding the Tian Shan range! (Drool) But how will we access of all these resources!? What's that? Soviet assistance, you say? Why, of course! (Image courtesy of the Center for Research Libraries)

Source:

• Zhongsu jingji hezuo xuexi shouce . Shanghai: Xingchao chubanshe, 1950. Available online in the Hunter Collection, thanks to the good folks at the Center for Research Libraries.

See also:

• For general information about the Hunter Collection, see none other than Adam Cathcart’s description available on the CRL website.
• The following 人民日报 / Remin Ribao / People’s Daily articles closely parallel the contents of the handbook. (which, if you are lucky and it works for you, can be accessed online via this website):

- 协助我国发展工业，中苏两国签订协定，创办联合股份公司，按平权合股原则组成，开采新疆石油及有色金属 ， March 29, 1950. First public announcement of the agreements following the signing ceremony in Moscow on March 27.

– 新疆西安旅大等地人民热烈拥护中苏和办公司，认为苏联的帮助将加速我国工业化，April 4, 1950. Praise for Sino-Soviet economic cooperation from around the country.

- 欢迎有利于中国经济建设的中苏经济合作，April 5, 1950. A ridiculously long exposition on why the agreements are inherently good. After explaining the benefit to China and that the agreements are on based on Sino-Soviet equality, there is a long-winded explanation of Soviet history and why Lenin approved of this type of arrangement.

– 中苏三协定将加速我国工业化，首都人民热烈拥护，一致感谢苏联兄弟帮助，April 5, 1950.  Interviews with workers, common folk, professors, and students who support the agreements.

- 从中苏盟约说到中苏在新疆经济合作的意义–张治中四月十九日在中央人民广播电台播讲，April 23, 1950. Breaking out the big guns– none other than trusted authority on Xinjiang and the northwest, Zhang Zhizhong.

Leaving the New Frontier

The United States has not had an official diplomatic presence in Xinjiang for 60 years now. In fact, for many years Xinjiang was closed off not just to Americans but to all foreigners entirely, experiencing a resurgence in tourism and foreign trade only after the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s opening and reform policy. We can imagine the clerks at the China desk at Main State sulking that the U.S. no longer has an office in the capital Urumqi, particularly in light of the violence that occurred in Urumqi this past summer (See here for a parallel idea on Tibet). While opening up a new consulate in Urumqi would be a long negotiating process with the Chinese (who in all likelihood would not permit this), closing the consulate in 1949 occurred much more rapidly and haphazardly than anyone anticipated.

The U.S. Consulate Urumqi opened only in 1943, when provincial warlord Sheng Shicai reoriented his government more towards the Guomindang than the Soviet Union. With the effective transfer of power to the GMD, the United States was invited to Urumqi. Time’s report on this event is worth quoting in full for its vivid, passionate description of Xinjiang:

Across the central Asiatic wastes in China’s far Northwest hinterland is fabulous, remote Sinkiang province (Chinese Turkestan), once a wild and bloody tribal battleground, now a virtual Russian buffer state. To Chiang Kai-shek this had long been an undeveloped treasure house, a possible last refuge for Free China; to Russia it was a cushion against Japanese-infiltrated Mongolia, against British influence from India. Last week the U.S. planned a consulate there—deeper inside Asia and Asiatic politics than this Government had ever penetrated before.

While the Consulate was welcomed with great fanfare, the closing of the Consulate was problematic. When the U.S. Department of State made the decision to close the U.S. Consulate in Urumqi (contemporarily known as Dihua) on August 16, 1949, the local staff was immediately encumbered with numerous logistical challenges. U.S. planes were barred from flying in the province, so how were staff to be evacuated out of Xinjiang? Shelves were overflowing with papers stamped T.S., or top-secret, but who was going to stay behind to destroy classified cables and materials, sensitive equipment, and otherwise ensure nothing compromising fell into the hands of the arriving PLA troops? These questions and others weighed on the Consulate staff, but time was of the essence.

On Novemeber 14, 1949, Time reported that most of the U.S. Consulate staff had arrived safely in India from Xinjiang. The American public heard for the first time the miraculous details of the journey, and John Hall Paxton, U.S. Consul General, and his wife Vincoe garnered a bit of fame for their brave exploits on the trip. Paxton was credited with engineering the escape of his group of sixteen Foreign Service Officers, family members, and local staff:

Old China Hand Paxton, who had come to the Orient first with his missionary parents at the age of two, called his staff together for a conference. They decided to trek out of embattled Tihwa by truck and jeep, over the age-old route across the mighty Himalayas to India.

The first leg of their journey was to leave Urumqi and head southwest for Kashgar, a cultural and religious center for Uyghurs. In jeeps and trucks, the team drove through the Turfan Depression and the Taklamakan Desert for 1000 miles before arriving finally in Kashgar.

View Larger Map 1000 mile journey from Urumqi to Kashgar, passing through the Turfan Depression and the Taklamakan Desert.

Once they arrived in Kashgar,  they spent several weeks haggling over caravan prices to lead them into India. In another instance of spectacular journalistic writing, Time wrote:

At teeming, primitive Kashgar the party was held up for three weeks, haggling for a caravan to take them into India. On from Kashgar, the route led 500 miles to Kargalik, through the walled, rug-making, Moslem town of Yarkand. Mutinous Chinese Nationalist troops, who had not been paid for seven months, were in possession of Yarkand, and it took Paxton’s smoothest Chinese to talk his party’s way through. Paxton dismissed the truck and the jeeps, and hired ten caravan men with 33 horses and a handful of camels and donkeys. A white mongrel dog named It (Turki dialect for dog) decided to join the caravan for pot luck.

The modern day Karakorom Highway. The delegation abandoned their jeeps for horses and camels in Kashgar and left for Yarkand. For weeks they tip-toed around Karakorom's high peaks

It would take several weeks before Paxton and his crew arrived in India. They first arrived in Ladakh province, where they were received well and hosted by Indian officials. When they arrived in Delhi on or around October 27, it had been 71-days since they left Urumqi.

Paxton’s responsibility was only to lead his crew out of the province. Responsibility for documents, equipment, and Consulate property was left behind for Douglas Mackiernan (Chinese: 马克南), ostensibly a Vice-Consul but in fact an agent of the nascent Central Intelligence Agency. As the only U.S. official left at the Consulate after August 20, Mackiernan thus prioritized the work that lay ahead as:

Destroy: All archives, cryptographic material and motion picture films
Sell if possible: Expendable Government supplies such as stationery supplies and gasoline.
Turn over to British Consulate General: US Government real estate and nonexpendable property.

Douglas Mackiernan

However, the sensitive radio equipment handed over to the British Consulate in Urumqi eventually fell into the hands of the PLA and the new provincial government in Xinjiang in November, becoming a bit of a diplomatic quagmire between the British and the Americans. Mackiernan nonetheless persisted in his work, and kept Main State in Washington, D.C. aware of the ominous situation developing in Xinjiang. Mackiernan left Xinjiang on September 27, after provincial leaders Tao Zhiyue and Burhan Shahidi initiated their “peaceful revolt” and turned over to the CCP. On October 3, an internal memorandum in the State Department noted that all diplomatic officials in Xinjiang were on their way out of the province.

Frank B. Bessac, Professor-Emeritus at the University of Montana

But Mackiernan would not be as lucky as Paxton, and he ended up losing his life on his way out of Xinjiang. On April 29, 1950, after a long journey to Tibet, Mackiernan and his fellow travelers encountered several hostile Tibetan border guards. Unsure of just who these men were, the Tibetans shot, killed, and decapitated Mackiernan and several others. Frank Bessac, a surviving member of the motley crew, was finally picked up by U.S. officials in July 1950. His day-by-day log from the trek into Tibet has been declassified and posted online.

Sources:

• “U.S. At War: Shangri-La Mission. Time, February 01, 1943.
• “Over the Hump.” Time, November 14, 1949.
• Foreign Relations of the United States , 1949. The Far East: China, Volumes VIII and IX and 1950. East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI.
• Gup, Ted. The Book of Honor: Covert Lives & Classified Deaths at the CIA, chapter 1.
• “Transmitting the Log of Mr. Frank Bessac’s Journey from Tihwa, Sinkiang,” September 21, 1950.

See also:

• John Hall Paxton papers at Yale University
• Frank Bessac. Death on the Chang Tang, Tibet 1950: The Education of an Anthropologist.
• Clubb, O. Edmund. China and Russia: “The Great Game.”

Online access to Chinese resources related to Xinjiang

Seeing as I attend a small liberal arts college in Ohio without a Chinese book collection in its library, it is constantly a struggle to find Chinese memoirs and published document collections. Although I have nearly unrestrained access to the glorious state book-exchange program OhioLINK, it is still problematic locating and tracking down Chinese sources, let alone those relevant to my research on Xinjiang. In Ohio, only Ohio State, Ohio University, and Oberlin College have Chinese book collections, and the collections at those libraries are no match for, say, Harvard’s Yenching Library. Thankfully, Chinese netizens seem to be all for the free flow of free information, and have already scanned many of the books I’ve been eager to get my hands on. Here is a sample, with hopefully more to come. I also plan to add annotations and general information about the authors soon enough.

All of the files are in PDF format, and may require updated font packs to view them. If Adobe Reader is troublesome, try Foxit Reader.

Burhan Shahidi / 包尔汉

Burhan Shahidi. Bao Er Han xuanji [Selected Works of Burhan Shahidi]. Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1989.

———. Xinjiang wu shi nian [Xinjiang: Fifty Years]. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1984.

Burhan Shahidi, a long time provincial leader in Xinjiang, was a self-described Chinese nationalist and, in the 1940s, a pro-Soviet. Although of the Tartar ethnicity, Burhan still adopts the questionable Han Chinese stance that Xinjiang has been part of China for thousands of years, revealing his great admiration for the Chinese nation. In his memoirs he explains his role in the “peaceful liberation” of Xinjiang and his frequent contacts with Deng Liqun, Peng Dehuai, and Mao Zedong. The Soviets, however, do not figure prominently into his narrative. Burhan’s memoir are useful because it offers an “on the ground” perspective of Xinjiang, as opposed to views from Beijing or Moscow. As with other memoirs from the PRC (particularly older memoirs), Burhan’s recollections do serve a political purpose and thus are not always true to the historical record.

Deng Liqun / 邓力群

Deng Liqun. “Xinjiang heping jiefang qianhou—zhongsu guanxi zhi yi ye” [“Before and After the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang—A Page in Sino-Soviet Relations”]. Jindaishi yanjiu 5 (1989): 143-150. Jump to page 143 in the PDF File

Deng Liqun (Han Chinese), the personal liaison of the CCP dispatched to Xinjiang in late summer 1949, recounts his experiences there. Deng describes the Soviet Union’s extensive involvement in Xinjiang throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. He contends that the Soviet Union’s support in getting PLA troops into Xinjiang was extremely important, and that overall the early 1950s was the “honeymoon period” of Sino-Soviet relations in Xinjiang. While Deng’s account has been widely used by both Chinese and western historians, there are a few aspects of his account that are questionable and contradict other primary sources. For instance, he claims that Stalin convinced Mao to arrive in Xinjiang more quickly because the United States wanted to establish an independent Islamic republic in Northwest China. In Russian sources, Stalin warns Mao only of the possibility of British meddling in Xinjiang and the negative impact this could have on the Chinese economy.

———. “Selection of Cables Sent and Recieved by the ‘Liqun Station.’”  Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 36 (1990): 1-38. Given that this one is impossible to find online, I scanned it personally after  painfully waiting for Pittsburgh University to send a photocopy of it. Apologize for the marginalia and for the orientation of some of the pages

Deng Liqun’s secret mission to Ili and Urumqi in the late summer and fall of 1949 has been widely noted by scholars for its successes. Without Deng’s presence on the ground in Xinjiang to coordinate with local leaders in the Ili regime as well as in the GMD controlled areas, the PLA could have arrived in Xinjiang nearly as swiftly or as safely. But Deng’s mission has heretofore remained all too shrouded in mystery. This selection of telegrams offers a preliminary step towards a better understand of Deng Liqun’s mission in Xinjiang.

———. Yan’an zhengfeng yihou [After the Yan’an Rectification Movement]. Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998.

Saypidin Azizi / 赛福鼎

Saypidin Azizi. Sai Fu Ding Huiyilu [Saypidin’s Memoirs]. Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1993.

Saypidin joined the CCP after Mao Zedong personally vouched for his credentials. He traveled to Moscow in 1950 on the team from Xinjiang to hammer out the details for several Sino-Soviet commercial agreements in Xinjiang. He was Vice-Chairman of the Provincial Government after “liberation” and served as Chairman from 1955 until 1978.

Wang Enmao. Wang Enmao Wenji [Collected Works of Wang Enmao]. Vol. 1. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997.

Wang Enmao / 王恩茂

———. Wang Enmao Wenji [Collected Works of Wang Enmao]. Vol. 2. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997.

Wang Enmao was the top Chinese official in Southern Xinjiang immediately following liberation. In 1952, he was promoted and made the Secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Sub-Bureau, making him the top ranking official in the province. Volume 1 follows his career from 1949 – 1981, while Volume 2 runs from 1981 – 1996.

Zhang Zhizhong / 张治中

Zhang Zhizhong. Zhang Zhizhong huilu [Memoirs of Zhang Zhizhong]. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1985.

Jiang Jieshi’s man on the ground in Xinjiang from 1945-1947, Zhang oversaw negotiations to reintegrate Ili (the East Turkestan Republic) into Provincial Government. In 1949, after he abandoned the GMD, Zhang came to counsel Mao Zedong and the CCP on the situation in Xinjiang.

For broader range of works, go here and here. Unfortunately for me, the thirteen volumes of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao do not load properly on my computer.

Mao Zedong’s instructions on publicizing the “arrival” of troops in Xinjiang

“Guanyu xie jiefangjun jinru Xinjiang de duanping gei Hu Qiaomu de xin”. October 21, 1949.

Qiaomu:

Our army arrived in Dihua [Urumqi] last night. Please write some commentary[about this] and have it ready by tomorrow so I can see it. News and commentaries on the PLA entering Xinjiang should not use the word “captured” [zhanling] but should use the word arrived [daoda]; in the commentaries it should be mentioned that the authorities of the army and government in Xinjiang agreed with and welcomed the PLA’s rapid arrival.

Mao Zedong
October 21, 3 p.m.

Source:

• Mao Zedong. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the P.R.C.]. Vol. 1 (September 1949 – December 1950). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987, p.83.

Xinjiang, Sino-Soviet Cooperation, and Anti-Soviet Sentiment among Beijing Students in 1950

In a quite illuminating article published in Xinjiang difangzhi, Wang Lianfang chronicles the rise-and-fall of Sino-Soviet joint ventures in Xinjiang in the 1950s. These are the very joint ventures that Mao Zedong would later denounce as Soviet colonialism in the late 1950s, and which Khrushchev readily referred to as among Stalin’s mistakes in his memoirs. From what I can gather, the idea and implementation for Sino-Soviet joint ventures in Xinjiang arose from the impetus to repair Xinjiang’s destitute economy after “liberation” with as much expediency as possible. Students in Beijing, according to Wang, reacted quite negatively to the announcement of these joint ventures in spring of 1950, calling these agreements a violation of Chinese sovereignty (“they cursed the Soviets for invading” Chinese territory). In the weeks following, radio broadcasts and editorials in Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] from some of China’s leading personalities defended the agreements because they sought to bring economic development to China’s “most backward” (economically speaking, that is) province.

Source:
• Wang Lianfang. “The Signing and Conclusion of the “Sino-Soviet Petroleum Co. Ltd. Agreement’” [“Zhongsu shiyou gufengongsi xieding” jianding he zhongzhi shilue]. Xinjiang difangzhi 4 (2008): 56-62.

PLA & Han Immigration to Xinjiang

Liu Haiwei [刘海卫] taking a rest in an ethnic Kyrgyz family’s yurt in Karakul Lake

One brisk spring day earlier this year, Doug Shultz and I spent a day driving through the Xinjiang  countryside with one Liu Haiwei. Liu, a self-described talker, rattled on and on as we sputtered on from Kashgar to Karakul Lake in his jeep. His rants, which he delivered in between smokes, ranged from the quality of American cars versus Japanese cars to the backward lifestyles of those Kyrgyz families who live around Karakul Lake. Although of Han ethnicity, he still slurped down a big bowl of homemade Kyrgyz noodles, drank yaks milk, and ate naan bread with some enjoyment. He, like so many others, moved to Xinjiang as a child when his father, a PLA soldier, was dispatched to the barren lands of Xinjiang.  One wonders how his business is suffering with the destruction (“renovation”) of old Kashgar and particularly the youth hostel where he met many of his customers, like Doug and myself.

Fear

…But, among the soldiers and cadre who will enter Xinjiang, there is still fear of such a long road ahead. They fear they’ll never return home, they fear marching through grasslands and passing through deserts, they fear the cold and so much more. To get rid of these fears, we need one month to prepare before entering Xinjiang.[i]

---

[i] Peng Dehaui’s Papers on Military Affairs [彭德怀军事文选 / Peng Dehuai junshi wenxuan], Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1988, p.310.

The Problem of a Gift

Liqun:
           Ref: Telegram of the afternoon of August 18.⁽²⁰⁾ Regarding the question of the Xinjiang Ethnic Representatives presenting a gift, your response is appropriate.
                                                                                                            Central Committee
                                                                                                                        August 19 [1949]

(20) On the Afternoon of August 17, Deng Liqun wrote to the CCPCC and said that the Xinjiang representatives [coming to Beijing] had brought up that, according to the ethnic customs and formalities, when you go to a new area you should always bring the hosts gifts to show ones respect. They want to know what gift to bring to Beijing to give to our Party’s leaders. Deng told them that …the Party leaders in Beijing just want you to bring the opinions and views of the people of Xinjiang to the meeting. This will be the best gift and you need not bring anything else. The Xinjiang representatives said to Deng that while they trust the Party leaders and will definitely bring with them the people’s opinions and views, they’ll feel uneasy if they go against their ethnic customs and don’t bring an actual gift…As to what gift, I [Deng] just gave a small piece of advice that I hoped it would have ethnic characteristics.[i]

---

[i] Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing xinjiang daibiao canjia xinzhengxie de dianbao,” [“Invitation from the Central Committee to Representatives of Xinjiang to attend the New CPPCC”], August 1949, in Jianguo yilai zhou enlai wengao [Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the P.R.C.], Vol. 1, (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2008), pp.270-277.

HIST 479: Exercise 1

Chuck Kraus
September 3, 2009

HIST 479: Exercise 1

I would like to pursue the history of Xinjiang province from 1949-1954. As a Chinese province, Xinjiang is unique for several reasons: it is home to several different ethnic minorities, many of whom are Muslim, notably the Uyghurs; it occupies a significant swath of territory in northwest China (one-sixth of China’s land mass); it borders nine countries; it is home to China’s only nuclear test site; and it is where vast amounts of China’s oil deposits are located. From these few facts alone, we can see that Xinjiang must be strategically important to the Chinese. But if the events of July 2009 are any reminder, an uneasy environment prevails in the province and ethnic tensions between Han Chinese and non-Han minorities often burst into outright violence.

As the scholar Gordon Bovingdon has pointed out, the history of Xinjiang is contentious. It has been hotly debated whether Xinjiang is rightfully China’s or whether Xinjiang has a right to independence. For histories of Xinjiang to be published in the People’s Republic of China, they must adhere to strict political guidelines set forth from above and often read as nationalist histories designed only to assure readers that Xinjiang is indelible from the motherland. On the other hand, Uyghur nationalist historians are guilty of many of the same academic crimes, often in the end writing polemics against Chinese misrule or of the ethnic superiority of the Uyghur. In recent years, however, a coterie of scholars in the west has sought a middle ground in order to explore the culturally rich and historically significant tract of land that Xinjiang now occupies. There is an urgent need for de-politicized histories of Xinjiang.

Finally, why Xinjiang from 1949-1954? To begin with, the literature on Xinjiang is most voluminous for the period of the Qing Dynasty (1644 – 1912). Scholars have begun to correct this deficit, but studies on Xinjiang after the establishment of the PRC remain most scarce. Secondly, literature on the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese revolution, and the reception of the Chinese Communist Party in its “honeymoon period” has been primarily focused on China proper. Localized studies have become more numerous in recent years, but again they tend to trace accounts in North China and East China. The study of Xinjiang in this period is not only an opportunity to expand the narrative into China’s frontier areas, but also an opportunity to explore the impact the Chinese revolution had upon ethnic minorities at the outset. I would also endeavor to include some discussion on Sino-Soviet cooperation in Xinjiang, as Russia/the Soviet Union maintained active involvement there during the 19^th and early 20^th centuries.

It would seem to be fitting to stop at 1954 because, at that point, new trends in Chinese politics began to develop: the first Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) and the beginning of the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Locally, the proposed timeframe also predates the designation of Xinjiang as the “Uyghur Autonomous Region” and of the Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps, a significant military/decision making body, in late 1954 and 1955. The totality of these events undoubtedly changed the dynamic of Xinjiang and it would seem befitting to save those events for other projects.

My knowledge of Xinjiang is admittedly less than, say, North Korea or Sino-North Korean relations in the same time period proposed. My interest in this project began simply by travelling there in spring 2009 and witnessing what I would call an uneasy environment between the Han Chinese and the Uyghurs. The relevance of the project became even more pronounced when protests and violence broke out in Urumqi in July 2009 in the largest single case of violent strife since Tiananmen Square in China. I have taken one course on the Chinese revolution which partially dealt with the “Peaceful Liberation” of Xinjiang (as it is termed in Chinese histories). I have already begun reading the region’s pre-modern and modern history with some rapidity, however, and am becoming quickly familiar with the available secondary literature.

KCNA Lacks Coverage of Xinjiang July 5 Riots

Today while digging around the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (North Korean state media) I had the idea to check the archives for commentary on the events in Xinjiang on July 5. North Korea typically publishes notes of sympathy or support during times of crisis in other countries, particularly those that it considers to be loyal allies or friends. I expected to find a report that criticized separatists who were trying to harm China or that generally agreed to narrative of the events set by Chinese authorities. I didn’t find anything.

Not believing my eyes, I opted for a more efficient means of finding what I was looking for: Google searching “Xinjiang site:kcna.co.jp.” I found that North Korea did afterall publish a story about a crisis in Xinjiang. But it was dated February 2003, and was a  ”message of sympathy” delivered after a deadly earthquake took place in Xinjiang:

Message of sympathy to Chinese President

Pyongyang, February 26 (KCNA) — Kim Yong Nam, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the DPRK, sent a message of sympathy to Jiang Zemin, President of the People’s Republic of China, on Feb. 25 in connection with a strong earthquake that hit the area of Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region in china, causing big human and material losses. Upon hearing this sad news, I express deep sympathy and consolation to you and, through you, to the government of the people’s republic of china and the people in the afflicted area, the message said.It expressed conviction that the people in the afflicted area would clear away the earthquake damage and bring their life to normal as early as possible under the leadership of the Communist Party and government of China.

Stumped as to why there was a news story about February 2003 but no news story about July 2009, my next idea was to check for Tibet to see if there actually was a complete void of commentary about separatism in China on KCNA. So I Google searched “Tibet site:KCNA.co.jp.” I found only three results, but this time there was one of interest. It was dated March 20, 2008, coinciding with the time of the riots in Lhasa. The report vehemently denounced the riots as organized ”separatist” activities designed to harm the ethnic unity of China. The report, using standard Chinese Communist Party terminology to explain the riots, sympathized with the Chinese people in this time of unrest:

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Slams Dishonest Forces’ Violence in Tibet

Pyongyang, March 20 (KCNA) — A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the following answer to a question raised by KCNA Thursday as regards cases of violence in Lhasa City, Tibet Autonomous Region of China:

There occurred assault, robbery, arson and murder in the above-said city recently.

This has touched off indignation and condemnation among all Chinese people as it was committed by Tibet separatists in an organized manner at the prodding of dishonest elements.

Tibet is part of an inalienable territory of China.

The DPRK government strongly denounces the unsavory elements for their moves to seek “independence of Tibet” and scuttle the upcoming Beijing Olympics and supports the Chinese government in its efforts to ensure social stability and the rule of law in Tibet and defend the fundamental interests of the Tibetan people.

To me it is odd that North Korea would denounce the riots in Lhasa in March 2008 but let the Xinjiang July 2009 riots go unreported (I can’t read Korean so perhaps they are covered in other papers? Anyone know?). Afterall, analysts are describing the Xinjiang riots as the deadliest protests/ethnic violence in China since 1989. While I could very well be exaggerating the significance of this, I do think the absence speaks to the current nature of Sino-North Korean relations. To prove my point, the DPRK even issued a note of regret in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the US, and, without criticizing the US whatsoever, condemned the act of terrorism (KCNA, coincidentally, did condemn the US that day, but in a separate report about US troops in South Korea). If the KCNA sympathized with their archenemy, why wouldn’t KCNA express sympathy for their big-brother to the north, China, as they typically have done in the past?

Why wouldn’t KCNA acknowledge and condemn the Xinjiang riots? Well perhaps it has something to do with UNSC Resolution 1874. Passed on June 14, UNSCR 1874 not only condemned the North Korean nuclear test of May 25 but also applied another set of sanctions. The next day a rally of 100,000 people took place in Kim Il Sung Square to protest the resolution. Although China was a “moderating voice” in the drafting of UNSCR 1874, China still voted for it and thus secured its passage. Was letting the Xinjiang riots go unreported North Korea’s way of expressing dissatisfaction with China? It could have been. North Korea wouldn’t go as far as openly criticizing China for passing Resolution 1874, but they can certainly use subtleties to express their resentment.

Sources:

• Message of sympathy to Chinese President. KCNA. (February 26, 2003).
• Foreign Ministry Spokesman Slams Dishonest Forces’ Violence in Tibet. KCNA. (March 20, 2008).
• DPRK stance towards terrorist attacks on US. KCNA. (September 12, 2001).