Douglas Mackiernan, Osman Batur, and the ‘Kazakh Exodus’

Douglas Mackiernan (1913-1950). Image Courtesy of the Long Riders Guild.

In June of 1947, the Mongolian People’s Republic with Soviet backing bombed a Chinese garrison in Beita Shan (北塔山)/Baitik Bogda. Beita Shan is 200 miles east of Urumqi, near the Xinjiang-Mongolian border. The U.S. State Department immediately suspected that the purpose of the Mongolian raid was to pressure Osman Batur, the leading Kazakh chieftain in Xinjiang province, to abandon his alliance with the Nationalist government and return to a friendly alliance with the Soviet Union and the East Turkestan Republic (ETR). In order to get a better sense of the Mongolian incursion (now widely referred to as the “Beita Shan Incident”), the U.S. Consulate in Urumqi (Dihua or Tihwa 迪化) dispatched the Vice-Consul Douglas Mackiernan (马克南) to the area to report on the situation.

Mackiernan was not merely a Vice-Consul, however, and he was not simply reporting on behalf of the U.S. State Department. As is widely known, Mackiernan was primarily an agent of the nascent Central Intelligence Agency, known then as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).

Osman Batur (1899-1951). Image courtesy of Wikimedia.org

It appears that it was during this trip that Mackiernan established his relationship with the infamous Kazakh bandit Osman Batur (乌斯满). Reports published in the series Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) highlight that Osman became a key source of information for Mackiernan in June 1947. Mackiernan sensed how powerful of a force Osman was among his followers in Xinjiang and that Osman could have been useful in eventually sabotaging efforts of either the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang. Whether or not the U.S. had an official policy of preventing Communist influence in Xinjiang, or if this was a personal agenda set by Mackiernan, is unclear. In any case, Mackiernan did grow personally attached to Osman and his struggle as time went on. Mackiernan, in writing about Osman, noted what providing the Kazakhs with ammunition and weapons could do for their struggle:

The Kazaks in Peitashan [Beita Shan] are all loyal to Osman and regard him as an able leader who will do his best to get them back to their native home in northern Ashan. Osman declares that given an initially supply of weapons and ammunition, sufficient to start an offensive, he could remove Outer Mongolian threat to Peitashan and clear Ashan zone of the Reds under Talinhan, keeping themselves supplied as they advance by capture of material from the opposition. (569)

The Beida Shan incident had come only weeks after Osman Batur’s ties with the East Turkestan Republic (ETR) were severed. For a variety of both financial and political reasons, Osman broke away from the ETR and aligned himself more closely with the Nationalist (Guomindang) regime in Xinjiang. Many of Osman’s successful raids in 1947 came in part because of aid he received from the Nationalist government in Urumqi. As U.S. Consul General John Hall Paxton reported in September, 1947 (available in FRUS):

Osman’s forces have been pushing forward rapidly in Ashan zone and have taken Chingho and Fuwen. In their progress they have killed and captured many of the enemy, seized much booty and accumulated local Kazaks who welcomed Osman’s victories and joined his fighters…Osman’s advance was aided by Chinese material but insists no Chinese troops were sent and declares that present drive was disapproved by Chinese. (572-573)

The extent of Mackiernan’s relationship with Osman after 1947 is not entirely clear. However, it seems that the People’s Liberation Army’s arrival in Xinjiang prompted the U.S. Consulate to offer Osman more sympathy than before. According to Ted Gup in Book of Honor, “the relationship between the two [Mackiernan and Osman] grew closer in subsequent months as the Communist threat increased” (17). Godfrey Lias’ interviews with Kazakh refugees in Turkey also seems to indicate that Osman’s Kazakh forces turned to the U.S. more often in summer of 1949 than they had prior:

It was a dangerous mission so far as Ali Beg was concerned because the provincial Government had declared him to be an enemy of the State. It may have been just as dangerous for [U.S. Consul General] Mr. Paxton’s diplomatic status for him to receive such an officially disreputable character, but he agreed to do so. (145)

Osman Batur in front of a yurt. Image courtesy of Fangwen's Blog.

Osman’s political affiliation with the GMD and his uncertain ties to Mackiernan and the U.S. Consulate in Urumqi meant that, once the Chinese Communist Party entered Xinjiang in 1949, Osman Batur became an immediate target for retaliation. Osman relished the challenge, however, as he refused to surrender to the CCP, in direct contrast to the maneuvers of Burhan Shahidi, Tao Zhiyue, and the East Turkestan Republic. A large group of Kazakh herdsmen and their families under the leadership of Osman Batur and Janim Khan (贾尼木汗), opted to flee from the PLA. Chinese sources allege that from March until December of 1950, Osman and his bandits killed, looted, and caused a great degree of chaos within Xinjiang. Thus, Wang Zhen (王震) is said to have organized Bandit Suppression Units (剿匪指挥部) and the Northern Xinjiang Bandit Suppression Frontline Command (北疆剿匪前线指挥部).

Ultimately, Osman would be caught and summarily executed, but others close to him survived and fled Xinjiang. They first arrived in Kashmir, where they stayed temporarily, before moving on permanently to Turkey. Along their journey from Kashmir to Turkey, they met several western journalists and authors who were eager to publish the story of the ‘Kazakh exodus’ and of Osman Batur.

Professor Emeritus Frank B. Bessac (b. 1922). Image courtesy of the University of Montana.

Douglas Mackiernan, the last American official to leave the province, was in as much danger as Osman was. As I wrote in an earlier post, Mackiernan was responsible for destroying as much classified materials held at the U.S. Consulate when it was clear that PLA would soon advance into Xinjiang in autumn 1949. While everyone else at the Consulate departed (including the Consul General John Hall Paxton), Mackiernan stayed behind until his job was done. When Frank Bessac, Fulbright Scholar and fellow OSS agent, arrived in Urumqi in late September 1949, Mackiernan looked at him and said:

Do you want to join Osman Bator (the great nomadic Kazakh leader of Chinese Turkestan) with me? Maybe we can be of assistance to him.” (Death on the Chang Tang, 51)

Mackiernan and Besssac linked up with Osman’s forces in Barkol Lake after wandering for two weeks outside of Urumqi in October 1949. Mackiernan wrote in his log that “[we] left Urumchi on September 27, 1949 and arrived in Barkul about two weeks later in company of Ozman Bator’s Kazak Hordes.” From October through November, Mackiernan, Bessac, and the rest of the group traveled from Barkol to ‘Goose Lake’ (referred to variously as Gezkul, Ghaz Kol, and Ghoz Kol) in Qinghai province, where they remained until March 1950.

They were met by Hussein Taiji and his Kazakhs in ‘Goose Lake,’ which for the budding anthropologist Bessac was a wonderful opportunity to continue his studies. As the story was told by the Kazakh refugees in Turkey to Godfrey Lias in the mid-1950s:

On March 15, 1950, an unexpected visitor arrived in the Gezkul area: Douglas Mackiernan, the American Vice-Consul, who had disappeared from Urumchi mysteriously on the very day that the Eighth Route Army vanguard entered it, namely, September 11, 1949. Urumchi is, at most, fourteen days distant from Gezkul on horseback and leading camels, which is how Mackiernan was travelling, but he had been five and a half months on the journey. Where and how he spent the intervening five and a half months is not known to Ali Beg, or maybe he knows but would not tell me because he has a rule not to speak of other people’s business. An American named Frank Bessac who was with Mackiernan said in an article in Life that they spent the winter in camp but he did not give details. (170)

Before he departed, Douglas Mackiernan allegedly tore this five-dollar bill in half and gave it to a Kazakh counterpart. Image originally included in Godfrey Lias' book Kazakh Exodus

But as Mackiernan and Bessac continued their journey across Xinjiang and into Tibet, they would not always encounter friendly faces. Bessac recalled:

As I came to the crest of the hill I heard shots and assumed the horsemen had attacked our tent. I saw all four of my comrades emerge from our tent together, arms raised and with a white flag. Four Tibetans dismounted and approached with guns leveled. Suddenly, one pulled the trigger and then the others followed suit. (94)

Mackiernan had been killed by a group of Tibetan border guards. Bessac and one other, a White Russian named Vasili, survived. It wasn’t until July of 1950 that Bessac could finally say his journey across Xinjiang, Tibet, and into India was finally over.

Publicly, Osman’s ties to Mackiernan received much attention in the Chinese press. After Osman was caught by the PLA in 1951, he is said to have written a confession where he admitted that Mackiernan had directed or instigated (策动) much of his resistance activities. To celebrate Osman’s capture, on February 26, 1951 the national paper People’s Daily published an article titled “Northwest Army captures Osman alive, Dihua [Urumqi] begins public trial for Janimhan’s execution” (西北我军生擒匪首乌斯满  迪化举行公审枪决贾尼木汗).

Osman's trial occured in April 1951. Image courtesy of Fangwen's blog.

The article reported that in early February near the Qinghai-Gansu border, PLA troops “captured the bandit chieftain Osman Batur, the armed spy of the U.S. imperialists who is hated by all of the northwestern peoples.” The short article also introduced some background information on Osman, who was perhaps a mysterious figure to nationwide audiences up until this point. The article criticized Osman’s previous alliance with the GMD and his efforts to sabotage the ‘Three Districts Revolution,’ or the ETR. It also claimed that beginning in July of 1948 Osman began seeking out assistance from Mackiernan at the U.S. Consulate. As late as September 1949, Mackiernan provided Osman with gold, guns, and ammunition for his resistance efforts. On May 5, 1951, the same paper reported that Osman had been executed. Burhan Shahdi had overseen Osman’s trial, which accused Osman of carrying out mass killings under the direction of the U.S. Consulate in Urumqi.

Osman Batur's very public, open air trial in Urumqi's People's Square in April 1951. Image courtesy of Chinaxinjiang.cn

Osman was sentenced to death following his trial in 1951. Image courtesy of Fangwen's blog.

It is, however, extremely doubtful that Mackiernan had the capabilities to supply weaponry from the United States to Osman. As Godfrey Lias writes in the 1956 account Kazakh Exodus of the U.S. Consulate’s ability to aid Osman generally:

But it is one thing to send supplies across an ocean, even an ocean infested by submarines, and quite another to send them to the very centre of Asia two thousand miles from the nearest friendly seaport, which was Karachi, and over the highest and most intractible mountains in the world.

So the utmost that [John] Hall Paxton [American Consul General in Urumqi] could offer freely was sympathy and advice. (145-146)

Or, in Frank Bessac’s own words:

What did Mackiernan hope to accomplish by remaining with Osman Bator? Wasn’t our very presence endangering him and his Kazakh allies? When Mackiernan asked me to join the Kazakhs with him he said something about helping them. When I brought this up again he said despairingly that all they were asking from him were weapons and he did not have the means to get get weapons to them…

The more I think about this, the more I think Doug was purchasing protection and assistance from Osman Bator rather than recruiting him…It may not have been Mackiernan leveraging affairs for the Kazakhs with the CCP, but the Kazakhs helping Mackiernan hide and escape. (63-64)

Resources:

1. The 1956 account of Osman Batur and the ‘Kazakh exodus’ from Xinjiang to Turkey written by Godfrey Lias is available to read online here thanks to the folks at Pratyeka.org.

2. For reports from the U.S. Consulate on contact with Osman Batur in 1947, see “Unsuccessful attempts to resolve political problems in Sinkiang; extent of Soviet aid and encouragement to rebel groups in Sinkiang; border incident at Peitashan,” in United States Department of State,  Foreign relations of the United States, 1947. The Far East: China, 546-587. It is available online here.

3. For notes from Douglas Mackiernan and Frank Bessac’s journey out of Xinjiang and into Tibet, see the declassified logs which have been posted online here thanks to the Long Riders Guild. Bessac also wrote a memoir: Death on the Chang Tang, Tibet 1950: The Education of an Anthropologist.

4. Michael Hayden, Director of the CIA from 2006 until 2009, paid tribute to Mackiernan’s career quite succinctly in 2008 speech at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council available online here.

5. For books on Mackiernan’s life and career, see Thomas Laird and Ted Gup. A great photo gallery of Mackiernan and his time in Xinjiang is available on the website for Laird’s Into Tibet here.

6. The Time magazine obituary of the last U.S. Consul General to have been stationed in Xinjiang, John Hall Paxton, is available online here. Paxton led the famous trek of consulate officials and their families across Xinjiang and into India in 1949-1950.

7. For a Chinese account of Osman Batur, see Fangwen’s blog (方文的博客) from 2007 linked here. I borrowed some of the photos used in this post from Fangwen. There are also some good photos of the PLA’s anti-bandit campaigns in the early 1950s on Chinaxinjiang.cn here.

The CIA's Book of Honor. Douglas Mackiernan is listed first. Image courtesy of CIA.gov