“KCNA Blasts U.S. Human Rights Abuses at Secret Prisons”

A recent report from North Korean state media (can’t help but feel a little bit like Rush Limbaugh when he says the “state controlled Associated Press” as I type this) highlights how the torture debate in the United States fuels propaganda in pariah states. Citing ABC News and data from the FBI, the report includes grim details like:

All forms of torture such as no-sleep torture, sex torture and hairy caterpillar torture are being practiced against prisoners in the U.S. overseas secret prisons, stunning the world people.

A number of innocent people are meeting death there, without being known to the outside world, after suffering untold pain.

Or, more domestic centered claims such as this:

The number of white ultra-right organizations advocating white suprematism is increasing and racial discrimination is becoming ever more undisguised.

According to data available from the FBI, 100 percent of the black people who killed whites are liable to face heavy penalties whereas just 40 per cent of the whites who killed black people are sentenced to such penalties.

Is the first sentence a recognition of the Tea Party movement? Although the Tea Party movement denies that white racism is one of its main tenets, racist themes and undertones are often highly visible at Tea Party rallies. See Tea Party leader Dale Robertson for example (the Huffington Post provides others):

Or that comment could be a reference to media reports from this past summer about a rising number of radical, white, conservative organizations/militias in the United States. In any case, I would wager that this type of propaganda is distributed quite widely in North Korea. Often times we see North Korean media digging up comments from obscure wackos in the U.S. and Europe to bolster their reporting like John Paul Cupp (much as the Chinese media always says “西方媒体,” but really they are often referencing atypical view points or news stories), but in the case of racism, North Korea really doesn’t have to dig too deeply. What better way to challenge the alleged greatness of the United States than by widely publicizing its darker sides?

Criticizing race relations in the United States is actually nothing new for North Korea. It has been a widely used propaganda tactic since about 1950 to heighten anti-Americanism in the DPRK. Take this political cartoon, lifted from the North Korean magazine Arrow [Hwalsal] in the late 1940s:

The Ku Klux Klan depicted in North Korean media

Targeting American life at home, the first panel depicts New York City and the Statue of Liberty in the background, polluted with a grimmer picture of poverty and despair among the American masses in the foreground. In the  center panel, America’s complex internal race relations are target, with men in Ku Klux Klan outfits carrying handguns in a space littered with bodies. The last panel on the page displays a wealthy businessman jockeying a chained up employee, reinforcing the drawbacks of the capitalist system for the working masses. Targeting American society through depictions of economic and social inequality and racism have remained strong propaganda tactics for the North Korean media.

Doesn’t this KCNA news story reinforce the idea that torture, rendition, Guantanamo, etc. only embolden America’s enemies?

Sources:

• KCNA Blasts U.S. Human Rights Abuses at Secret Prisons. January 6, 2010.

Carsick Cars – Zhong Nan Hai (中南海)

Little late on this one, but the Beijing underground music scene is getting a lot of attention in the U.S. press lately. Carsick Cars, along with Xiao He and P.K. 14, are actually finishing up a tour tonight in the U.S. For those of you who frequent Beijing, check out the club D-22 in Wudaokou. The video is Carsick Cars performing their hit, Zhong Nan Hai (apparently referring to the cigarettes, not the place…抽烟的抽)

More on Chinese punk / post-rock / indie:

Maybe Mars / 兵马司 (Beijing-based record label…the epicenter of it all)

“CHINA’S UNDERGROUND PUNKS” at the Economist

“China Exports Rock ‘N’ Roll” at CNN (video)

Music Has the Right to People (if you wish to download full albums)

Handbook on Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation in Xinjiang

I have previously written of resistance from patriotic students in Beijing to the agreements signed between the Soviet Union and China in March 1950 which called for the creation of several joint-stock companies in Xinjiang. There were three agreements concerning Xinjiang: one establishing a joint civilian airline company, another for a petroleum enterprise, and the last for the mining of nonferrous metals. Although the terms of the agreements were publicly portrayed as being based on the principle of equality, the exact texts of the agreements remained secret. Galvanized students protested Sino-Soviet economic cooperation, believing the three agreements were early harbingers of China’s renewed exploitation by foreign powers. (Readers, this summary might also sound familiar if you’ve read or consulted Dieter Heinzig’s voluminous Die Sowjetunion und das Kommunistische China, 1945-1950– I mean, The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance. Page 376, to be exact).

Courtesy of the Center for Research Libraries

Well, yesterday evening I rather carelessly stumbled upon a bit of a goldmine, the Zhongsu jingji hezuo xuexi shouce, a study guide or primer on the agreements, published in April 1950. You might simply call this piece of work “In Defense of Sino-Soviet Cooperation: A Guide for Students.” If students in China were really concerned that China’s sovereignty and control over Xinjiang was in jeopardy as a result of dealings with the Soviet Union, then this guide was designed to assuage student complaints. Page after page, quote after quote, the booklet assaults any argument against Sino-Soviet cooperation and, indeed, attempts to instill a sense of guilt among those who ever doubted the goodness of Sino-Soviet commercial agreements.

The contents of the book appear to focus on three different forms of Sino-Soviet economic cooperation, including Soviet loans to China and the Sino-Soviet civilian airline, but it in fact primarily focuses on the agreements for the Sino-Soviet petroleum and nonferrous metals companies in Xinjiang. It’s table of contents is, roughly, as follows:

1. Text of Agreements and News Bulletins [Xieding zhengwen ji gongbao]
2. Chinese Public Opinion [Guonei yulun]
3. Expressions from All Walks of Life [Gejie biaoshi]
4. Research on the New Sino-Soviet Agreements [Zhongsu xin xieding yanjiu]
5. Materials for Study and Reference [Xuexi ji cankao ziliao]

Sections 1 and 2 are largely reprints from newspapers such as Xinhua, Renmin Ribao, and Xinjiang Ribao. Part 3 is more interesting and contains statements from a variety of individuals. Of note, there are considerably more defenses published for the joint stock companies in Xinjiang (more than 20) than the Soviet loan (5). Moreover, we also hear from big names such as Tao Zhiyue and Zhang Zhizhong.

Given his long experience in the northwest, Zhang Zhizhong was probably viewed as one of China proper’s most foremost experts on Xinjiang, and his approval of Sino-Soviet cooperation probably carried more weight than any other onlooker. In his writing, Zhang consistently expressed that these types of agreements were precisely what the people of Xinjiang had wanted for decades. What’s more, Zhang explained, China simply had no way to develop the “new frontier” on her own, with shortages in machinery and technical expertise, and severe transportation difficulties.

Commander Tao Zhiyue supports Sino-Soviet cooperation, and so should you!

His counterpart, Tao Zhiyue added that the GMD and Sheng Shicai had ruined previous Sino-Soviet cooperation in Xinjiang, and in doing so did a great deal of detriment to the people of Xinjiang. Tao, the esteemed general who cut off contact with the Guomindang and announced his allegiance to the PLA in September 1949, admired the Soviets technical expertise and what China stood to learn from the Soviet Union. His argument boiled down, working with the Soviet Union will speed up the process of developing Xinjiang, mining it’s precious resources, and industrializing the nation– how is this not in China’s favor?

Other interviewees included Beijing-based professors, Chinese experts on oil and gas, and at least one local from the Ili region named Ma-er-guo-fu [马尔果夫], formerly of the Eastern Turkestan Republic’s National Army ["民族军"]. Ma-er-guo-fu (whose original name is unclear) was so excited that he “立刻要翻译人员拿着报纸详细地给他讲解公报的全文,” in other words, because his Chinese was poor, he summoned a translator to read him the Chinese newspaper reports in full. He believed Sino-Soviet cooperation in oil production would help alleviate some of the transportation difficulties that had handicapped Xinjiang’s economic development for years– maybe now the trader from Kashgar would finally see the Altaic vistas in northern Xinjiang? Xinjiang’s daunting terrain had been a burden to the cohesiveness of the province since the beginning of time, and hence also to China’s rule over the restive region, and Ma-er-guo-fu was advocating Sino-Soviet economic cooperation in order to finally overcome this hurdle. (I recommend reading Rudelson’s wonderful and concise Oasis Identities for a discussion on this  issue).

Section 4 includes several essays on the benefits of Sino-Soviet cooperation in Xinjiang, including one piece written by a research team from prominent newspaper Ta Kung Pao [大公报]. Section 5 includes a nice map, which I’ve posted below. Ideally I’ll review Sections 4 and 5 with a little more depth over the next several days and update this post.

Readers, look at all the goods surrounding the Tian Shan range! (Drool) But how will we access of all these resources!? What's that? Soviet assistance, you say? Why, of course! (Image courtesy of the Center for Research Libraries)

Source:

• Zhongsu jingji hezuo xuexi shouce . Shanghai: Xingchao chubanshe, 1950. Available online in the Hunter Collection, thanks to the good folks at the Center for Research Libraries.

See also:

• For general information about the Hunter Collection, see none other than Adam Cathcart’s description available on the CRL website.
• The following 人民日报 / Remin Ribao / People’s Daily articles closely parallel the contents of the handbook. (which, if you are lucky and it works for you, can be accessed online via this website):

- 协助我国发展工业，中苏两国签订协定，创办联合股份公司，按平权合股原则组成，开采新疆石油及有色金属 ， March 29, 1950. First public announcement of the agreements following the signing ceremony in Moscow on March 27.

– 新疆西安旅大等地人民热烈拥护中苏和办公司，认为苏联的帮助将加速我国工业化，April 4, 1950. Praise for Sino-Soviet economic cooperation from around the country.

- 欢迎有利于中国经济建设的中苏经济合作，April 5, 1950. A ridiculously long exposition on why the agreements are inherently good. After explaining the benefit to China and that the agreements are on based on Sino-Soviet equality, there is a long-winded explanation of Soviet history and why Lenin approved of this type of arrangement.

– 中苏三协定将加速我国工业化，首都人民热烈拥护，一致感谢苏联兄弟帮助，April 5, 1950.  Interviews with workers, common folk, professors, and students who support the agreements.

- 从中苏盟约说到中苏在新疆经济合作的意义–张治中四月十九日在中央人民广播电台播讲，April 23, 1950. Breaking out the big guns– none other than trusted authority on Xinjiang and the northwest, Zhang Zhizhong.

Leaving the New Frontier

The United States has not had an official diplomatic presence in Xinjiang for 60 years now. In fact, for many years Xinjiang was closed off not just to Americans but to all foreigners entirely, experiencing a resurgence in tourism and foreign trade only after the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s opening and reform policy. We can imagine the clerks at the China desk at Main State sulking that the U.S. no longer has an office in the capital Urumqi, particularly in light of the violence that occurred in Urumqi this past summer (See here for a parallel idea on Tibet). While opening up a new consulate in Urumqi would be a long negotiating process with the Chinese (who in all likelihood would not permit this), closing the consulate in 1949 occurred much more rapidly and haphazardly than anyone anticipated.

The U.S. Consulate Urumqi opened only in 1943, when provincial warlord Sheng Shicai reoriented his government more towards the Guomindang than the Soviet Union. With the effective transfer of power to the GMD, the United States was invited to Urumqi. Time’s report on this event is worth quoting in full for its vivid, passionate description of Xinjiang:

Across the central Asiatic wastes in China’s far Northwest hinterland is fabulous, remote Sinkiang province (Chinese Turkestan), once a wild and bloody tribal battleground, now a virtual Russian buffer state. To Chiang Kai-shek this had long been an undeveloped treasure house, a possible last refuge for Free China; to Russia it was a cushion against Japanese-infiltrated Mongolia, against British influence from India. Last week the U.S. planned a consulate there—deeper inside Asia and Asiatic politics than this Government had ever penetrated before.

While the Consulate was welcomed with great fanfare, the closing of the Consulate was problematic. When the U.S. Department of State made the decision to close the U.S. Consulate in Urumqi (contemporarily known as Dihua) on August 16, 1949, the local staff was immediately encumbered with numerous logistical challenges. U.S. planes were barred from flying in the province, so how were staff to be evacuated out of Xinjiang? Shelves were overflowing with papers stamped T.S., or top-secret, but who was going to stay behind to destroy classified cables and materials, sensitive equipment, and otherwise ensure nothing compromising fell into the hands of the arriving PLA troops? These questions and others weighed on the Consulate staff, but time was of the essence.

On Novemeber 14, 1949, Time reported that most of the U.S. Consulate staff had arrived safely in India from Xinjiang. The American public heard for the first time the miraculous details of the journey, and John Hall Paxton, U.S. Consul General, and his wife Vincoe garnered a bit of fame for their brave exploits on the trip. Paxton was credited with engineering the escape of his group of sixteen Foreign Service Officers, family members, and local staff:

Old China Hand Paxton, who had come to the Orient first with his missionary parents at the age of two, called his staff together for a conference. They decided to trek out of embattled Tihwa by truck and jeep, over the age-old route across the mighty Himalayas to India.

The first leg of their journey was to leave Urumqi and head southwest for Kashgar, a cultural and religious center for Uyghurs. In jeeps and trucks, the team drove through the Turfan Depression and the Taklamakan Desert for 1000 miles before arriving finally in Kashgar.

View Larger Map 1000 mile journey from Urumqi to Kashgar, passing through the Turfan Depression and the Taklamakan Desert.

Once they arrived in Kashgar,  they spent several weeks haggling over caravan prices to lead them into India. In another instance of spectacular journalistic writing, Time wrote:

At teeming, primitive Kashgar the party was held up for three weeks, haggling for a caravan to take them into India. On from Kashgar, the route led 500 miles to Kargalik, through the walled, rug-making, Moslem town of Yarkand. Mutinous Chinese Nationalist troops, who had not been paid for seven months, were in possession of Yarkand, and it took Paxton’s smoothest Chinese to talk his party’s way through. Paxton dismissed the truck and the jeeps, and hired ten caravan men with 33 horses and a handful of camels and donkeys. A white mongrel dog named It (Turki dialect for dog) decided to join the caravan for pot luck.

The modern day Karakorom Highway. The delegation abandoned their jeeps for horses and camels in Kashgar and left for Yarkand. For weeks they tip-toed around Karakorom's high peaks

It would take several weeks before Paxton and his crew arrived in India. They first arrived in Ladakh province, where they were received well and hosted by Indian officials. When they arrived in Delhi on or around October 27, it had been 71-days since they left Urumqi.

Paxton’s responsibility was only to lead his crew out of the province. Responsibility for documents, equipment, and Consulate property was left behind for Douglas Mackiernan (Chinese: 马克南), ostensibly a Vice-Consul but in fact an agent of the nascent Central Intelligence Agency. As the only U.S. official left at the Consulate after August 20, Mackiernan thus prioritized the work that lay ahead as:

Destroy: All archives, cryptographic material and motion picture films
Sell if possible: Expendable Government supplies such as stationery supplies and gasoline.
Turn over to British Consulate General: US Government real estate and nonexpendable property.

Douglas Mackiernan

However, the sensitive radio equipment handed over to the British Consulate in Urumqi eventually fell into the hands of the PLA and the new provincial government in Xinjiang in November, becoming a bit of a diplomatic quagmire between the British and the Americans. Mackiernan nonetheless persisted in his work, and kept Main State in Washington, D.C. aware of the ominous situation developing in Xinjiang. Mackiernan left Xinjiang on September 27, after provincial leaders Tao Zhiyue and Burhan Shahidi initiated their “peaceful revolt” and turned over to the CCP. On October 3, an internal memorandum in the State Department noted that all diplomatic officials in Xinjiang were on their way out of the province.

Frank B. Bessac, Professor-Emeritus at the University of Montana

But Mackiernan would not be as lucky as Paxton, and he ended up losing his life on his way out of Xinjiang. On April 29, 1950, after a long journey to Tibet, Mackiernan and his fellow travelers encountered several hostile Tibetan border guards. Unsure of just who these men were, the Tibetans shot, killed, and decapitated Mackiernan and several others. Frank Bessac, a surviving member of the motley crew, was finally picked up by U.S. officials in July 1950. His day-by-day log from the trek into Tibet has been declassified and posted online.

Sources:

• “U.S. At War: Shangri-La Mission. Time, February 01, 1943.
• “Over the Hump.” Time, November 14, 1949.
• Foreign Relations of the United States , 1949. The Far East: China, Volumes VIII and IX and 1950. East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI.
• Gup, Ted. The Book of Honor: Covert Lives & Classified Deaths at the CIA, chapter 1.
• “Transmitting the Log of Mr. Frank Bessac’s Journey from Tihwa, Sinkiang,” September 21, 1950.

See also:

• John Hall Paxton papers at Yale University
• Frank Bessac. Death on the Chang Tang, Tibet 1950: The Education of an Anthropologist.
• Clubb, O. Edmund. China and Russia: “The Great Game.”

Online access to Chinese resources related to Xinjiang

Seeing as I attend a small liberal arts college in Ohio without a Chinese book collection in its library, it is constantly a struggle to find Chinese memoirs and published document collections. Although I have nearly unrestrained access to the glorious state book-exchange program OhioLINK, it is still problematic locating and tracking down Chinese sources, let alone those relevant to my research on Xinjiang. In Ohio, only Ohio State, Ohio University, and Oberlin College have Chinese book collections, and the collections at those libraries are no match for, say, Harvard’s Yenching Library. Thankfully, Chinese netizens seem to be all for the free flow of free information, and have already scanned many of the books I’ve been eager to get my hands on. Here is a sample, with hopefully more to come. I also plan to add annotations and general information about the authors soon enough.

All of the files are in PDF format, and may require updated font packs to view them. If Adobe Reader is troublesome, try Foxit Reader.

Burhan Shahidi / 包尔汉

Burhan Shahidi. Bao Er Han xuanji [Selected Works of Burhan Shahidi]. Beijing: Minzu chubanshe, 1989.

———. Xinjiang wu shi nian [Xinjiang: Fifty Years]. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1984.

Burhan Shahidi, a long time provincial leader in Xinjiang, was a self-described Chinese nationalist and, in the 1940s, a pro-Soviet. Although of the Tartar ethnicity, Burhan still adopts the questionable Han Chinese stance that Xinjiang has been part of China for thousands of years, revealing his great admiration for the Chinese nation. In his memoirs he explains his role in the “peaceful liberation” of Xinjiang and his frequent contacts with Deng Liqun, Peng Dehuai, and Mao Zedong. The Soviets, however, do not figure prominently into his narrative. Burhan’s memoir are useful because it offers an “on the ground” perspective of Xinjiang, as opposed to views from Beijing or Moscow. As with other memoirs from the PRC (particularly older memoirs), Burhan’s recollections do serve a political purpose and thus are not always true to the historical record.

Deng Liqun / 邓力群

Deng Liqun. “Xinjiang heping jiefang qianhou—zhongsu guanxi zhi yi ye” [“Before and After the Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang—A Page in Sino-Soviet Relations”]. Jindaishi yanjiu 5 (1989): 143-150. Jump to page 143 in the PDF File

Deng Liqun (Han Chinese), the personal liaison of the CCP dispatched to Xinjiang in late summer 1949, recounts his experiences there. Deng describes the Soviet Union’s extensive involvement in Xinjiang throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. He contends that the Soviet Union’s support in getting PLA troops into Xinjiang was extremely important, and that overall the early 1950s was the “honeymoon period” of Sino-Soviet relations in Xinjiang. While Deng’s account has been widely used by both Chinese and western historians, there are a few aspects of his account that are questionable and contradict other primary sources. For instance, he claims that Stalin convinced Mao to arrive in Xinjiang more quickly because the United States wanted to establish an independent Islamic republic in Northwest China. In Russian sources, Stalin warns Mao only of the possibility of British meddling in Xinjiang and the negative impact this could have on the Chinese economy.

———. “Selection of Cables Sent and Recieved by the ‘Liqun Station.’”  Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 36 (1990): 1-38. Given that this one is impossible to find online, I scanned it personally after  painfully waiting for Pittsburgh University to send a photocopy of it. Apologize for the marginalia and for the orientation of some of the pages

Deng Liqun’s secret mission to Ili and Urumqi in the late summer and fall of 1949 has been widely noted by scholars for its successes. Without Deng’s presence on the ground in Xinjiang to coordinate with local leaders in the Ili regime as well as in the GMD controlled areas, the PLA could have arrived in Xinjiang nearly as swiftly or as safely. But Deng’s mission has heretofore remained all too shrouded in mystery. This selection of telegrams offers a preliminary step towards a better understand of Deng Liqun’s mission in Xinjiang.

———. Yan’an zhengfeng yihou [After the Yan’an Rectification Movement]. Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998.

Saypidin Azizi / 赛福鼎

Saypidin Azizi. Sai Fu Ding Huiyilu [Saypidin’s Memoirs]. Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1993.

Saypidin joined the CCP after Mao Zedong personally vouched for his credentials. He traveled to Moscow in 1950 on the team from Xinjiang to hammer out the details for several Sino-Soviet commercial agreements in Xinjiang. He was Vice-Chairman of the Provincial Government after “liberation” and served as Chairman from 1955 until 1978.

Wang Enmao. Wang Enmao Wenji [Collected Works of Wang Enmao]. Vol. 1. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997.

Wang Enmao / 王恩茂

———. Wang Enmao Wenji [Collected Works of Wang Enmao]. Vol. 2. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997.

Wang Enmao was the top Chinese official in Southern Xinjiang immediately following liberation. In 1952, he was promoted and made the Secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Sub-Bureau, making him the top ranking official in the province. Volume 1 follows his career from 1949 – 1981, while Volume 2 runs from 1981 – 1996.

Zhang Zhizhong / 张治中

Zhang Zhizhong. Zhang Zhizhong huilu [Memoirs of Zhang Zhizhong]. Beijing: Wenshi ziliao chubanshe, 1985.

Jiang Jieshi’s man on the ground in Xinjiang from 1945-1947, Zhang oversaw negotiations to reintegrate Ili (the East Turkestan Republic) into Provincial Government. In 1949, after he abandoned the GMD, Zhang came to counsel Mao Zedong and the CCP on the situation in Xinjiang.

For broader range of works, go here and here. Unfortunately for me, the thirteen volumes of Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao do not load properly on my computer.

民族英雄

Harvard girl marries man from an Anhui village in Shenzhen; Anhui man becomes national hero online:

Source:

• 邮局里一见钟情 深圳一小伙娶哈佛洋媳妇(组图)

Mao Zedong’s instructions on publicizing the “arrival” of troops in Xinjiang

“Guanyu xie jiefangjun jinru Xinjiang de duanping gei Hu Qiaomu de xin”. October 21, 1949.

Qiaomu:

Our army arrived in Dihua [Urumqi] last night. Please write some commentary[about this] and have it ready by tomorrow so I can see it. News and commentaries on the PLA entering Xinjiang should not use the word “captured” [zhanling] but should use the word arrived [daoda]; in the commentaries it should be mentioned that the authorities of the army and government in Xinjiang agreed with and welcomed the PLA’s rapid arrival.

Mao Zedong
October 21, 3 p.m.

Source:

• Mao Zedong. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the P.R.C.]. Vol. 1 (September 1949 – December 1950). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987, p.83.

Vietnam says embrace the “harmonious society,” or else

The Economist reports that Vietnamese “nationalist bloggers” are facing repercussions from the  government for criticizing China. In a country with a long, often antagonistic history with China, it is no surprise that politically active Vietnamese might object to lucrative mining concessions and growing trade relations with China. That countrymen at China’s backdoor are in opposition to China is a reminder, if we needed one at all, that China’s “Charm Offensive” has its limits (and so does Joshua Kurlantzick’s thesis, by the way).

In any case, I’m left wondering if the Chinese Embassy in Hanoi or Consulate-General in Ho Chi Minh City had any part in tracking down the anti-Chinese bloggers/intellectuals and reporting them to the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, à la North Korean diplomatic representatives in China monitoring the Chinese press.

Source:

• “Vietnam’s nationalist bloggers: Getting it off your chest,” The Economist, September 10, 2009

Reason to fear the Peaceful Rise? Or, Hey U.S., 不干涉内政

嗨美国，尊重我们的主权！不干涉我们的军事现代化!

A war of words between China and the U.S. over the trajectory of China’s military modernization program is on going. Although the feud is  by no means a new phenomenon in U.S.-China relations, an Associated Press piece highlights yet another “round” of criticism from the U.S. and the deflection of that criticism by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. U.S. criticisms center around three points: 1) China’s pursuit of natural resources (hardly a day goes by without hearing about China inking some new deal to snatch up oil or precious minerals somewhere) , 2) the Chinese military’s activity in cyberspace (the potential to wage cyber warfare), and 3) China’s military modernization, particularly how it will affect U.S. military presence in the Pacific.

Gun laws and culture wars

This past Friday evening, at a bar in semi-rural northeast Ohio no less, I was privy to sit in on an intense debate regarding gun laws in America. The debate/argument might be roundly summed up as a war of divergent cultures: an east coast college educated liberal (Boston area) sponsoring “sensible gun laws” versus a hard-working, Midwestern ”conceal and carry” type of guy. You can imagine that neither side made any headway in convincing one another, yet both sides became increasingly angry and agitated. I think it’s pretty clear which side of the fence I am on, as I’ve never owned a gun and see no reason to ever own one, but I stayed out of the debate almost entirely– only adding in my understanding when a question of whether a certain law existed or not. It was probably an unfair debate to begin with– the “east coast liberal” had just spent several months doing advocacy work for “sensible gun laws” in Washington, D.C.– but the amount of misinformation the Midwestern gentleman spewed out was rather disturbing. In general his argument pointed toward an extreme paranoia of President Obama and what “he is doing” to this country– or the perceptions of what he is doing to this country. The paranoia was frightening, but, to some degree of thankfulness, the man admitted he doesn’t vote.

On the other hand, I think President Obama calling Kanye West a “jackass” scored him some points with middle America– at least that’s what I gathered on Saturday night when I sat down with some middle-aged blue collar workers in Canton, OH. Not only could they not believe the that the President would call someone a jackass, they thought it was hilarious and even admirable.

Anyways, the whole debate reminded me of many late evening conversations with Chinese taxi drivers in Hangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing from the past year. Every so often a Chinese cab driver would put me in a position to explain– or a justify– gun laws in the U.S. I would try to explain that I have no interest in owning a gun, but that it’s part of the U.S. constitution and some people feel as if it is their right to own a weapon. Constitution or not, the taxi drivers never could believe how easy it is to get a gun in the U.S., and they imagined a sort of dooms day scenario if the situation was the same in China.